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This article examines whether the European Union (EU) already had legal 
personality prior to the EU’s Constitutional Convention’s statement in the 
autumn of 2002 on the need to provide the EU with legal personality. 
Abolition of the distinction between the Union and the two surviving 
Communities is an essential aspect of simplifying the Treaties, and making the 
European constitutional order easier to understand for those subject to it. It 
follows that there has to be a single Union legal personality; but recognition of 
this would not, in itself, entail any extension of the Union’s powers. However, 
one wonders whether, by giving the conferment of legal personality such a 
prominent place in the EU Constitutional Treaty, the draftsman may regard 
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this as more than the purely technical matter, which it ought to be. Efforts go 
back to 1996, with a study presented in the form of a draft treaty for the 
European Parliament, and coordinated by scientists at the Robert Schuman 
Centre of the European University Institute in Florence: “A Unified and 
Simplified Model of the European Communities Treaties and the Treaty on 
European Union in Just One Treaty.” However, simplification of the treaties 
today means more than having just one treaty. Following a merger of legal 
personalities and of Treaties, if necessary, it would be anachronistic to retain 
the current pillar structure of the EU. Doing away with this pillar structure 
would help to simplify the architecture of the Union considerably. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this article is to discuss whether or not the European Union 
(EU) already had legal personality prior to the EU’s Constitutional 
Convention’s statement in the autumn of 2002 on the need to provide the EU 
with legal personality.1 By legal personality, we understand the capacity to 
 
1 This is a very debatable issue among scholars and practitioners. Some authors argue that the 
EU does have legal personality through Article 24 TEU. Among the many authors who have 
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enter into contractual and other relations with third States, and to bear full 
responsibility for one’s actions. In this respect, two disclaimers need to be put 
forward: First, I will analyze this issue mainly from the angle of foreign 
policy, and not trade policy, since in the case of external trade policy, it is the 
European Community (EC),2 and not the EU, that concludes international 
trade agreements; Second, throughout this article, terms such as European 
Union and European Community appear continuously. It is important to 
clarify the difference between them, which is presented in Part II.  
 
studied this issue are Tizzano, A. "La Personnalité Internationale de l'Union Européenne," 
REVUE DU MARCHE UNIQUE EUROPEEN, Paris, No. 4, 1998, pp. 11-40; Sommet 
d'Amsterdam: conclusion de la CIG, LETTRE MENSUELLE SOCIO-ECONOMIQUE, 
Bruxelles, No. 27, September 1997, pp. 16-27; Remiro Brotons, A. "Consideraciones sobre la 
Conferencia Intergubernamental de 1996," GACETA JURÍDICA DE LA CE, Boletín, 
Madrid, No. 110, February 1996, pp. 7-18; Pechstein, M. "Une personnalité internationale 
pour l'Union Européenne?," REVUE DES AFFAIRES EUROPEENNES, Paris, Année 6, No. 
3, December 1996, pp. 229-233; Vilariño Pintos, E. "Representación exterior y cooperación 
diplomática y consular en el Tratado de la Unión Europea," REVISTA DE INSTITUCIONES 
EUROPEAS, Madrid, Vol. 22, No. 2, Enero-Abril 1995, pp. 417-443; De Gucht, K. "The 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP): is there room for new perspectives in the 
aftermath of Maastricht?," STUDIA DIPLOMATICA, Bruxelles, Vol. 50, No. 2, 1997, pp. 
49-83. 
2 The most important of three European Communities, the European Community was 
originally founded on March 25, 1957 by the signing of the Treaty of Rome under the name of 
European Economic Community. The 'Economic' was removed from its name by the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which at the same time effectively made the European Community 
the first of three pillars of the European Union, called the Community (or Communities) 
pillar. 
EU Legal Personality  Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 4
With two remaining Communities3 (currently there are only two 
Communities,4 since the European Coal and Steel Community [ECSC] Treaty 
expired on July 23, 2002),5 one Union, and three different pillars6 of 
 
3 In the 1950s, six European countries decided to pool their economic resources and set up a 
system of joint decision-making on economic issues. To do so, they formed three 
organizations. European Communities is the name given collectively to these three 
organizations, i.e., the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic 
Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), when in 1967, 
they were first merged under a single institutional framework with the Merger Treaty. They 
formed the basis of what is today the European Union.  
The EEC soon became the most important of these three communities, and was 
eventually renamed simply the European Community, subsequent treaties adding it further 
areas of competence that extended beyond the purely economic areas. The other two 
communities remained extremely limited: for that reason, often little distinction is made 
between the European Community and the European Communities as a whole. Furthermore, 
in 2002 the ECSC ceased to exist with the expiration of the Treaty of Paris which established 
it. Seen as redundant, no effort was made to retain it — its assets and liabilities were 
transferred to the EC, and coal and steel became subject to the EC Treaty. 
With respect to trade, it should also be said that the WTO Agreement was concluded 
by the European Communities and not by the European Community. It was thought that, to 
the extent the Uruguay Round Agreements concerned matters falling within the scope of the 
ECSC or the Euratom Treaty, these agreements fell outside the competence of the European 
Community. 
4 In fact, the two remaining Communities work as one entity which functions in the 
framework of two Treaties, even if they are legally different. In this sense, legally binding 
agreements concluded by the EC are still signed on behalf of one or both of the existing 
Communities. It must be said clearly that the EC, and not the EU, is a member of the World 
Trade Organization or regional fisheries organizations, to give just two examples. In this 
respect, see Sack, J. “The European Community’s Membership of International 
Organizations”, Common Market Law Review, 32, 1995, pp. 1227-1256. 
5 See the decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the EU Member States, 
meeting within the Council, on 27 February 2002 on the financial consequences of the expiry 
of the ECSC Treaty and on the research fund for coal and steel at 2002/234/ECSC, Official 
Journal of the European Communities L 79, Vol. 45, 22 March 2002, in 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_079/l_07920020322en00420059.pdf (last 
visited June 17, 2005). Also see, http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/misc/74346.pdf, p. 2. 
6 Later on in this article, I will elaborate on what Torrent calls the "fourth pillar" of the EU. 
The pillar illustration has become widely known as metaphorically being part of a Greek 
temple, symbolising the EU's institutional structure. This Hellenic architectural illustration is a 
creation of Sir Geoffrey Howe, former UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs. The European Union takes decisions in three separate domains (policy areas), also 
known as the three pillars of the EU: 
1. The first pillar is the 'Community domain,' covering most of the common policies, 
where decisions are taken by the so-called 'Community method' – involving the 
Commission, Parliament and the Council-; The Community method is the EU's usual 
method of decision-making, in which the Commission makes a proposal to the 
Council and Parliament who then debate it, propose amendments and eventually 
adopt it as EU law. In the process, they will often consult other bodies such as the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. 
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competences7 and decision-making, it is no wonder that third parties are often 
puzzled.8 In order to avoid this chaos, it was proposed at the Amsterdam 
Intergovernmental Conference of 1996-1997 to create a single legal entity, the 
European Union,9 just like the United Nations (UN) or the World Trade 
 
2. The second pillar is the common foreign and security policy, where decisions are 
taken by the Council alone; and  
3. The third pillar is 'police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters,' where – once 
again – the Council takes the decisions.  
 
Within the first pillar, the Council normally takes decisions by qualified majority 
vote. In the other pillars, the Council decision has to be unanimous; it can therefore be 
blocked by the veto of any one country. If the Council so decides, it can use the so-called 
'Community bridge' to transfer certain matters from the third to the first pillar. This procedure 
for transferring certain matters from the third pillar of the EU to the first pillar is done so that 
they can be dealt with using the Community method. Any decision to use the bridge has to be 
taken by the Council, unanimously, and then ratified by each Member State. 
7 The term “competence” appears very often throughout this paper. It originates from the 
French term competence to refer to the authority or power to do or develop something. Thus, 
EC competence, as opposed to national competence, is the authority conferred on the EC, as 
opposed to a national government, to be in charge of a certain policy or issue. 
8 For a comprehensive study on the ramifications of the expiration of the ECSC, see 
Ubertazzi, B. “The End of the ECSC,” European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 8 (2004) N° 
20, at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-020a.htm (last visited February 15, 2006), as well as 
Groenendijk N. and Hospers G.J., A requiem for the European Coal and Steel Community, in 
De Economist 2002, 601-612. Also, Meunier P., La Communauté européenne du charbon et 
de l’acier est morte, vive la fédération européenne, in Revue du Marché commun et de 
l’Union européenne 2001, 509-515 ; Obwexer W., «Das Ende der Europäischen Gemeinschaft 
für Kohle und Stahl», in Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 2002, 517-524; Vallterra 
M.C., «La disolución de la Comunidad Europea del carbón y del acero: estado actual», in 
Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo 2002, 393-432. 
9 The European Union or EU is an intergovernmental and supranational union of 25 European 
countries, known as EU Member States. The European Union was established under that name 
in 1992 by the Treaty on European Union (the Mastricht Treaty). The European Union's 
activities cover all areas of public policy, from health and economic policy to foreign policy 
and defence. However, the extent of its powers differs greatly between areas. Depending on 
the area in question, the EU may therefore resemble: 
1. a federation (for example, on monetary affairs, agricultural, trade and environmental 
policy);  
2. a confederation (for example, in social and economic policy, consumer protection, 
home affairs); or  
3. an international organization (for example, in foreign policy). 
Since the Treaty on European Union came into force (Maastricht Treaty or TEU) on the 
1st of November 1993, the use of the expression "European Union" has been generalized. At 
the same time, among the experts, the use of "pillars of the European Union" is very much a la 
mode. These two phenomena are to be regretted since they tend to create confusion (with an 
indiscriminate use of the expression "European Union") or they tend to introduce a kind of 
false compartmentalization (i.e., division of competences in the EU by pillars) on the 
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Organization (WTO).10 This proposal was perceived as a possible transfer of 
sovereignty in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
Unfortunately, this discussion focused on the question of the exercise of 
competence, and the idea of the EU as a single actor (legal person) does not 
prejudge the powers of the EU in, say, the common foreign and security 
policy. 
Instead of being faced with two international organizations (the 
remaining two Communities), and the EU as an umbrella concept for these 
organizations as well as the second and third pillars, third States are now 
facing two organizations (the Communities) and a third legal (?) person (the 
EU), which appears as a different entity from the Communities. This situation 
hardly corresponds to the basic institutional principles of the TEU, such as 
Article 1.3 TEU11 or Article 3.2 TEU.12 From this, we can deduce that there is 
 
institutional reality to which these expressions make reference. The reasons which motivate 
this regret are mainly political: the fact of knowing who does what, and therefore who is 
responsible for certain issues, constitutes the conditio sine qua non, on one hand, for policy-
makers to master the nature of their decisions and, on the other hand, for a minimum of 
democratic control to be possible. 
10 Since the creation of the ECSC and the adoption of the Euratom and EEC Treaties, efforts 
have been made to join the then three European Communities: the Treaty of Rome, which 
established certain institutions common to all three Communities (such as the Court of Justice, 
or the Parliamentary Assembly); the Treaty of Brussels of April 8, 1975, which joined the then 
three Communities’ executive powers in one Commission and administration; or, most 
recently, the fusion of the treaties of the EU into the EU Constitutional Treaty, granting 
thereby legal personality to the EU. The Union will therefore be able to represent both the EU 
and its Member States, conclude international agreements, and become a member of 
international organizations beyond the case of the WTO or FAO. In other words, the EU will 
finally be able to take action and assume responsibility on behalf of its Member States. 
11 Article 1.3 TEU predicates that “The Union shall be founded on the European 
Communities”. 
12 Article 3.2 TEU reads that “The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its 
external activities as a whole”. 
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a need for clarification and for more coherence to the institutional image of the 
EU in the outside world.13 
The genesis and raison d’etre of this article is because I have noticed 
that lawyers, academics, and international civil servants alike often times 
confuse the terms European Community (EC) and European Union (EU), 
especially when it comes to international relations and international law. I start 
my analysis with a legal distinction between the EC and the EU, focusing on 
foreign policy more generally first, and then on external economic policy. To 
conclude whether the EU has legal personality, I then test arguments for and 
 
13 There is a vast body of literature on this matter, especially the work of the European 
Convention on the future of Europe, Working Group III on the EU’s legal personality, guided 
by Professor Amato. Other literature, Rama Montaldo M., International Legal Personality and 
Implied Powers of International Organizations, in BYIL 1970, 111; What follows is a non-
exhaustive indication of readings I have come across in the field of EC external trade 
relations: Allen, J.J., The European Common Market and the GATT, The University Press of 
Washington, D. C., 1960; Bekemans, L. & Tsoukalis, L. (eds.) Europe and Global Economic 
Interdependence, College of Europe and European University Press, 1993; Bourgeois, J.H.J. 
“The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: an Echternach Procession”, Common 
Market Law Review 32, 1995, pp. 763-787; Dashwood, A. “External Relations Provisions of 
the Amsterdam Treaty,” Common Market Law Review 35, 1998, pp. 1019-1045; Da Fonseca-
Wollheim, H. & Krenzler, H. “Die Reichweite der gemainsamen Handelspolitik nach dem 
Vertrag von Amsterdam- eine Debatte ohne Ende”, Europarecht 1998, pp. 223 ff.; Demaret, 
P. Relations extérieures de la Communauté européenne et marché intérieur: aspects 
juridiques et fonctionnels, Story-Scientia, 1986; Heidensohn, K. Europe and World Trade,
Pinter, 1995; Henig, S. External Relations of the European Community. Associations and 
Trade Agreements, Chatham House: PEP, 1971; Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations 
Economiques Exterieures dans l'Union Europeenne, in 
http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html, 1998; Pescatore, P. “Opinion 1/94 on 
“Conclusion” of the WTO Agreement: is there an Escape from a programmed Disaster?”, 
Common Market Law Review 36, 1999, pp. 387-405; Petersmann, E.-U. “Application of 
GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities”, Common Market Law Review 
20, 1983, pp. 397-437; Piris, J.-C. “La Capacité de l’Union Europeenne de s’engager et d’agir 
en Matiere de Relations Economiques Exterieures: l’example de l’OMC”, Florence, Academy 
of European Law, Coference given by Jean-Claude Piris, Jurisconsult of the Council of the 
European Union, on the 15th July 1998; Völker, E.L.M. Barriers to External and Internal 
Community Trade, Kluwer, 1993; Völker, E.L.M., (ed.) Protectionism and the European 
Community, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1987; Woolcock, S. Market Access Issues 
in EC-US Relations. Trading Partners or Trading Blows?, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1991. 
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against the existence of the EU’s legal personality by analyzing Article 24 of 
the Treaty on European Union. 
 
II. A Comparison between the European Union and the European 
Community 
 
A.- A General Overview
Most people wrongly believe that the EC has been replaced by the EU. This is 
inaccurate since both entities co-exist. The main difference between the two is 
that, technically speaking, only the EC has legal personality and, therefore, as 
we will see later, can conclude international agreements, buy or sell property, 
sue and be sued in court.14 All these are competences which the EC has, but 
the EU does not. The EU comprises the EC and its Member States. The 
European Union is the political and institutional framework in which the EC's 
and certain Member States' competences are exercised. In the case of Member 
States, the competences within the institutional framework of the EU are the 
 
14 On the implications of international legal personality, see Arangio-Ruiz G., Diritto 
internazionale e personalità giuridica, Clueb, Bologna, 1971, 255; Pescatore P., Les relations 
extérieures des Communautés européennes. Contribution à la doctrine de la personnalité des 
organisations internationales, in 103 RC 1961, II, 137; Rama Montaldo M., International 
Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International Organizations, in BYIL 1970, 111; 
Seyersted F., ‘International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations. Do their Capacity 
really depend upon their Constitutions?,’ in Indian Journal of International Law 1964, 39; 
Seyersted F., Is the International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations valid vis-a-
vis non members?, Indian Journal of International Law 1964, 260. See also Granvik, L. 
“Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of 
Bindingness” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects of the European Union, 
Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 255. 
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second and third pillars (Common Foreign and Security Policy, and police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, respectively) of the EU. The EU, 
established by the Treaty15 on European Union (TEU) [also known as the 
Treaty of Maastricht],16 now has 25 Member States17 and a complex structure, 
 
15 Treaties are usually composed of articles, Protocols and Declarations. As an example we 
have the Treaty of Amsterdam, composed of 15 articles, 13 Protocols and 58 Declarations. In 
the case of the EU, there are currently founding treaties, amending treaties, accession treaties 
and budgetary treaties. There is also an EU Constitutional Treaty, which seeks to consolidate, 
simplify and replace the existing set of overlapping treaties. It was signed in Rome on October 
29, 2004 and is due to come into force in the near future, conditional on its ratification by all 
EU Member States. In the meantime, or if the EU Constitutional Treaty fails to be ratified by 
all EU Member States, the EU will continue to work on the basis of the current treaties. As for 
the founding treaties, there are four of them: the Treaty of Paris (1952), establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which expired in July 2002; the Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom); the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community (EEC); [these last two treaties are known as the Treaties of 
Rome (1958). However, when the term "Treaty of Rome" or the acronym "TEC" are used, it is 
to mean only the EEC Treaty]; and the Treaty on European Union (1993) [this Treaty changed 
the name of the European Economic Community to simply "the European Community" and 
introduced new intergovermental structures to deal with the aspects of common foreign and 
security policy, as well as police and judicial cooperation. The structure formed by these so-
called Three Pillars (Community pillar; foreign and security policy; police and judicial 
cooperation) is the European Union, whose scope then became more overtly political as well 
as economic]. With respect to the amending treaties, there are also four of them, which are: 
the Merger Treaty (1967), which provided for a Single Commisison and a Single Council of 
the then three European Communities; the Single European Act (1987), which provided for 
the adoptions required for the achievement of the Internal Market; the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(signed in 1997), whose purpose was, inter alia, to simplify decision making in addition to 
further integrating the common foreign and security policy concept. It also amended and 
renumbered the EU and EC Treaties; and the Treaty of Nice (signed in 2001), where qualfied 
majority voting was again extended to more areas, abolishing the national right to veto in 
some policy areas. A concept of "enhanced co-operation" was introduced for countries 
wishing to forge closer links in areas where other EU Member States disagreed. The accession 
treaties came into being for every enlargement of the EU. As for budgetary treaties, there have 
been two: the Budgetary Treaty of 1970, which gave the European Parliament the last word on 
what is known as "non-compulsory expenditure;" and the Budgetary Treaty of 1975, which 
gave the European Parliament the power to reject the budget as a whole, and created the 
European Court of Auditors. 
16 OJ C 191, July 29, 19992. The Treaty of Maastricht, establishing the European Union, 
transformed the European Economic Community into the European Community (Article G), 
including the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy 
Community. This required complex planning in order to take into account the specifics of the 
three founding treaties, and especially to make the EC the first of the three pillars of the EU. 
17 The six founding countries of the EU are France, (West) Germany, Belgium, The 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy.  The UK, Ireland and Denmark joined in 1973. Greece 
joined in 1981, whereas Spain and Portugal in 1986. East Germany reunited with West 
Germany in 1990 and consequently became part of the EU. Austria, Sweden and Finland 
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including both integrationist and intergovernmental elements, known as 
“pillars.” According to the TEU, the Union is founded on the European 
Communities (Article 1) and is served by a single institutional framework 
(Article 3). However, there are important legal differences between the 
European Communities and the EU (of which the Communities form a part, 
called the first pillar).18 
As we will see later, the institutional system of the EU is perceived in a 
confusing way, not only by the citizens of the Union but also by those who 
direct the Union, those politically responsible for it, and by the civil servants 
of the European Institutions. Thus, we must approach the institutional system 
of the EU with a double perspective: a legal side and a political side. A legal 
side, because one cannot direct or guide a system without knowing the rules of 
the game; a political side, because one must know the reasons for the 
malfunctioning of a system.  
Furthermore, Ambassador Hugo Paemen19 accepts the importance of 
making a terminological distinction between the EC and the EU when dealing 
with external relations. I cite him literally: 
 
joined in 1995. The last group of countries that joined the EU are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus, which joined in 
2004. More countries are expected to join in the near future: Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, 
and Turkey is an official candidate to join the EU. 
18 See Kennedy, T. Learning European Law. A Primer and Vade-mecum, Sweet and Maxwell, 
1998, pp. 49 et seq. 
19 Former Head of the European Commission Delegation to the United States. 
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“I should make a clear distinction between the terms 
‘European Community’ (or EC) and ‘European Union.’ 
After all, until the Treaty of Amsterdam comes into force, 
only the European Community will grant it legal 
personality. Therefore, please forgive me if occasionally I 
use the terms European Union where it is not correct: We 
went through a very painful adjustment period to go from 
the European Community to European Union, so it is 
somewhat difficult now to make the distinction.”20 
In relation to the potential legal personality of the European Union vis-
à-vis the European Community, it can be stated that European Community 
law, as well as the European Community, still exists alongside the European 
Union. So far, according to Article 281 EC,21 the Community has legal 
personality. Under international law, international organizations can have 
international personality, that is, rights and duties under the public 
international system of law.22 In this respect, the major international law 
precedent on the international personality of public international law 
institutions is the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the 
Reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations case.23 
20 See Paemen, H. “The European Union in International Affairs: Recent Developments,” 
Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 22, 1999, p. 136. 
21 Article 281 EC reads: The Community shall have legal personality. 
22 See Schermers, H.G. & Blokker, N. M., International Institutional Law: Unity within 
Diversity, 3rd edn, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1995, pp. 976-82; White, N. The Law of International 
Organisations, Manchester University Press, 1996. 
23 Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 174. 
EU Legal Personality  Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 12
Since the EC is an international organization, it can explicitly be given legal 
personality by a treaty which has created it. Concerning third States, what 
counts is the international practice of the organization and the links that such 
an organization creates with these third States. This practice and its links will 
(or will not) create the organization’s international legal personality.  
In September 1948, Count Bernadotte was the Chief United Nations 
Truce Negotiator in Jerusalem. He was killed by a gang of private terrorists. 
The United Nations General Assembly asked for an advisory opinion from the 
International Court of Justice to bring an international claim concerning 
injuries suffered by its employees in circumstances involving the 
responsibility of a State.24 Although the UN Charter does not expressly confer 
legal personality on the United Nations Organization, the Court examined the 
Charter as a whole and concluded that the UN was an international entity 
holding international rights and obligations, and capable of maintaining its 
rights by bringing international claims. The Court pronounced itself as 
follows: 
 
Accordingly, the Court has come to the conclusion that the 
Organisation is an international person. That is not the same as 
saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal 
personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a 
State…Whereas a State possesses the totality of international 
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rights and duties recognised by international law, the rights and 
duties of an entity such as the Organisation must depend upon 
its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its 
constituent documents and developed in practice.25 
So the question is: what, then, is the European Union? For the time 
being, it is just the institutional and political framework in which all EC's and 
certain (and only certain) Member States' competences are exercised. In the 
near future, once the EU Constitutional Treaty is implemented –or a similar 
legal document, if the EU Constitutional Treaty will never see the light of day- 
the Union will be more than just a simple framework and, therefore, will 
become an actor with its own legal personality and competences. Let me try to 
explain this argument by giving the example of former Yugoslavia.  
Firstly, if we think of sending military forces, then we are dealing with 
the 25 Member States of the Union acting outside the institutional system of 
the Union. However, one should not exclude the possibility that sending 
troops to former Yugoslavia may have a link with the common foreign and 
security policy. The borderline between Member States acting on their own, 
outside the institutional framework of the Union, and Member States acting 
within the political and institutional framework of the Union, is not very clear. 
Secondly, if we refer to the "European Administration" of the town of Mostar, 
 
24 McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, at p. 
27. 
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then we are dealing with Member States' competences in the framework of the 
EU. Thirdly, if we look at the commercial regime applicable to the republics 
of former Yugoslavia, then we are dealing with the EC's competences. 
These examples should illustrate the danger of an indiscriminate use of 
the expression “the European Union does...” Such an expression does not let 
us know who really does what: what does the EC as such do? What do the 25 
Member States together do in the framework of the Union? What do both 
Member States and the Community together do? Obviously it would be even 
worse to use the expression European Union when making reference to the 
Member States outside the EU’s institutional framework. Again, knowing the 
precise answer to these questions is vital, since the nature, as well as the legal 
and political consequences of this action, is completely different, depending 
on who acts.26 To defend this argument, allow me to suggest two examples: 
Example 1: "The European Union reacts to the Helms-Burton27 and 
d'Amato Acts.28" This statement could mean: 
a.- that the Community and the Member States both react to these two 
legislations, each with their own legal and political means; or 
b.- that Member States cede their responsibilities to appear behind a 
single action conducted by the Community. As a matter of fact, the 
 
25 Reparations Case: Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations 
[1949] ICJ Rep. pp. 179-80. 
26 Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures dans l'Union 
Europeenne, http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html, 1998, chapter 1, subtitle 1.1. 
27 The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (better known as the 
Helms-Burton Act) is a United States law which strengthens and continues the United States 
embargo against Cuba. 
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Community has very limited competences regarding such issues as the Helms-
Burton or d'Amato Acts. Therefore, its action has very little effect or 
repercussion. 
Example 2: “Agreements between the European Union and 
Mercosur,29 and the European Union and the Andean Community.30”
This expression does not reveal the main difference between both 
agreements. The agreement with Mercosur is an agreement signed between the 
EC and the Member States on the European side, and Mercosur and its 
Member States on the South American side, whereas the agreement with the 
Andean Community and its Member States has been signed only by the 
European Community on the European side. In other words, EC Member 
States have not participated in this second agreement. Therefore, the first 
agreement has a greater scope than the second one. The same difference exists 
between the Euromediterranean Agreements of the EC and its Member States 
with Tunisia,31 Morocco,32 Israel,33 and other countries, as well as the 
 
28 The d'Amato Act refers to the economic embargo by the U.S. government against 
companies of third countries investing in gas or oil in Iran and Libya. 
29 MERCOSUR stands for Mercado Comun del Sur (Common Market of the Southern Cone) 
and is composed of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. On 9 December 2005, 
Venezuela was accepted as a new member, but it will be officialized in late 2006. It was 
founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion, which was later amended and updated by the 
1994 Treaty of Ouro Preto. Its purpose is to promote free trade and the fluid movement of 
goods, peoples, and currency. 
30 The Andean Community is a trade bloc comprising until recently 5 South American 
countries: Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. In 2006, Venezuela announced 
its withdrawal, reducing the Andean Community to 4 member states. The trade bloc was 
called the Andean Pact until 1996, and came into existence with the signing of the Cartagena 
Agreement in 1969. Its headquarters are located in Lima, Peru. 
31 OJ L 97/1998, p. 1. 
32 Council Regulation 2211/78, 1978 O.J. (L 264) 1. 
33 Agreement between the European Economic Community and Israel, 1975 O.J. (L 136) 1 
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Euromediterranean Agreement with the PLO (Palestinian Liberation 
Organization).34 The latter Agreement was signed by only the EC (and not the 
EC and its Member States), and has a lesser scope than the former 
Agreements, since the EU Member States do not participate in the agreement. 
It is thus of vital importance to make certain linguistic clarifications 
which will ease the understanding of what we are trying to explain: 
a.- the expression “The Union does humanitarian work” actually 
means “The Community and/or its Member States, acting together in the 
framework of the European Union, do humanitarian work;” 
b.- the expression “The Union and its Member States” is rather 
confusing since the Union includes the Member States; however, we can speak 
of “the Community and its Member States.” Here we mean 26 different legal 
entities, each one of them having legal personality; 
c.- we can use the expression “The Union and its Member States act 
individually;” by this we understand activities carried out within the 
framework of the Union (by the Community and/or the Member States acting 
together), and activities carried out by the Member States outside the 
framework of the Union. 
 
B. - A Note on Foreign Policy
(signed on May 11, 1975, this was a free trade and cooperation agreement). 
34 OJ L 187/1997, p. 1. 
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The success of the EU on unity in commercial policy seems to be inextricably 
linked to its success with a coherent foreign policy. In fact, as is evidenced in 
the famous bananas and hormones disputes, both the political and economic 
aspects of the EU’s external relations are inseparable. At what was called the 
European Summit35 in The Hague in December 1969, the heads of State and 
Government of the six original Member States asked their ministers of foreign 
affairs to study how progress could best be made in the area of political 
unification. 36 Their report was a proposal for cooperation in the area of 
foreign policy, which became the basis of what, for 25 years, would be called 
European Political Cooperation (EPC).37 The procedure was purely 
intergovernmental and based on unanimity, a constraint reflecting a strong 
belief that foreign policy decisions remained under the sovereign competence 
of national governments.38 
John Peterson and Helene Sjursen argue that the move from European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) -in retrospect, a strikingly anodyne construction- 
to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was propelled by 
 
35 European (or EU) Summits are the meetings of heads of State and government (i.e., 
presidents and/or prime ministers, depending on what their national constitutions indicate) of 
all EU countries, plus the President of the European Commission. In today's EU politics, 
summits are embodied in the European Council, which meets, in principle, four times a year 
to agree upon overall EU policy and to review progress. The European Council is the highest-
level policy-making body in the European Union, which is why its meetings are often called 
“summits.” 
36 EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND CHANGING 
PERSPECTIVES IN EUROPE (Walter Carlsnaes & Steve Smith eds., 1994). 
37 For a description and analysis of such foreign policy co-ordination, see EUROPEAN 
POLITICAL COOPERATION IN THE 1980S: A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY FOR 
WESTERN EUROPE? (Alfred Pijpers et al. eds., 1988). 
38 L’UNION EUROPEENNE ET LE MONDE APRES AMSTERDAM (Marianne Dony ed., 
1999). 
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ambitions to create a “common” EU foreign policy analogous to, say, the 
common agricultural policy or common commercial policy.39 Yet, French 
national foreign policy decisions to test nuclear weapons in the Pacific, send 
troops to Bosnia, or propose a French candidate to head the European Central 
Bank could be viewed as far more momentous and consequential than 
anything agreed upon within the CFSP between 1995 and 1997. It is plausible 
to suggest, as David Allen does, that the EU simply does not have a “foreign 
policy”40 in the accepted sense of the term. Going one step further, the CFSP 
may be described, perhaps dismissed, as a “myth.”41 It does not, as the 
Maastricht Treaty promises, cover “all areas of foreign and security policy.”42 
Obviously, it is not always supported “actively and unreservedly by its 
Member States in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.”43 
That said, and knowing that the presumption in the European Union is 
to have collective action, is there really a “common” European interest? If so, 
is this interest so great as to assume that in certain circumstances Member 
States will act with a single voice? Do Member States have enough proximity 
in their national interests to act with one voice in the international sphere? 
 
39 Peterson, J. & Sjursen, H. “Conclusion. The Myth of the CFSP?”, in PETERSON, J. & 
SJURSEN, H. (EDS.) A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY FOR EUROPE? COMPETING 
VISIONS OF THE CFSP, Routledge, 1998, p. 169. 
40 Allen, D, `Who speaks for Europe? The search for an effective and coherent foreign policy' 
in Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H. (eds), A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY FOR EUROPE? 
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Following the same authors,44 the European Union has not yet reached 
its apogee in terms of its ability to act with power and unity in international 
affairs. However, some competences are exclusively of the European 
Community. Customs duties and protective non-tariff barriers (NTBs)45 such 
as quantitative limits, safety norms, health, and hygiene standards, were and 
are fixed by the Union as a whole, not by the individual Member States. 
 Although the Single European Act in 1987 established a legal basis for 
EPC, it remained largely unchanged and intergovernmental. Only when the 
EC faced the challenge of Central and Eastern Europe and the Iraqi crisis in 
1990 and 1991 was more thought given to increasing cooperation in foreign 
policy. The result was the “implementation of a common foreign and security 
policy including eventual framing of a common defence policy . . .” (Article B 
TEU).46 The fact that Title V of the Treaty on the European Union brought 
foreign policy under the umbrella of the EU represents a step forward in 
clarity. Having more transparent instruments is the result of requiring Member 
States to conform to common positions of the Council of Ministers.47 Through 
joint actions, the Member States are committed to acting in support of these 
common positions. Finally, provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty give the 
CFSP a clearer character by creating a High Representative of EU foreign 
 
44John Peterson & Helene Sjursen. 
45 NTBs are government measures or policies other than tariffs that restrict or distort 
international trade. Examples are import quotas, discriminatory government procurement 
practices, technical and scientific barriers related to plant health, environmental labelling, 
codes and standards, inter alia.
46 Official Journal C 191 of 29 July 1992. 
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policy (Title V of the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union), 
assisted by a new policy planning and early warning unit in the Secretariat of 
the EU Council.48 
At Maastricht, it was not possible for Member States to accomplish a 
common foreign and security policy in the framework of the traditional 
mechanisms of Community institutions and Community law.49 The second 
pillar50 of the EU does not presently provide for a real supranational decision-
making by majority voting. It utilizes unanimity as a decision-making system 
with the possibility of common positions51 (Article 12 of the Treaty on 
European Union [TEU])52 and joint actions53 (Article 13 TEU).54 
47 A Council common position is the provisional position agreed by the EU Council after the 
first reading stage of legislation, that is, after taking account of any amendments proposed or 
opinions offered by the European Parliament. 
48 Treaty of Amsterdam, declaration on the establishment of a policy planning and early 
warning unit, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, 132. 
49 These mechanisms are known in the Community institutions as those of the First Pillar. 
50 The so-called “second pillar” refers to the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the EU. 
51 The common position in the context of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is 
designed to make cooperation more systematic and improve its coordination. The EU Member 
States are required to comply with and uphold such positions which have been adopted 
unanimously at the Council. 
For reasons of simplification, the EU Constitutional Treaty which is in the process of 
being ratified restricts CFSP instruments to European decisions and international agreements. 
Once the EU Constitutional Treaty enters into force, common positions and their 
implementation will be based on European decisions (non-legislative instruments) adopted by 
the Council of Ministers.  
52 Article 12 TEU reads: 
 
The Union shall pursue the objectives set out in Article 11 by: 
defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, 
- deciding on common strategies, 
- adopting joint actions, 
- adopting common positions, 
- strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy. 
53 Joint action, which is a legal instrument under Title V of the Treaty on European Union 
(common foreign and security policy, CFSP), means coordinated action by the EU Member 
States whereby all kinds of resources (human resources, know-how, financing, equipment, et 
cetera) are mobilized in order to attain specific objectives set by the Council, on the basis of 
general guidelines from the European Council. 
EU Legal Personality  Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 21
It is the Treaty of Amsterdam55 which attempts to strengthen these 
mechanisms without implying major changes in this respect.56 A main change 
is that the Council of the EU may adopt joint actions or common positions by 
qualified majority if they are based on a common strategy decided upon by the 
European Council.57 However, in adopting a common strategy, the European 
Council58 must be unanimous, which diminishes the practical importance of 
this innovation. In addition, any Member State can declare that for “important 
and sated qualified reasons of national policy,” it will oppose the adoption of a 
decision to be taken by qualified majority, in which case such decision shall 
not be taken. 
 
For reasons of simplification, the EU Constitutional Treaty, which is in the process of 
being ratified, restricts CFSP instruments to European decisions and international agreements. 
Once the EU Constitutional Treaty enters into force, joint actions and the implementation of 
such action will therefore be based on European decisions (non-legislative instruments) 
adopted by the Council of Ministers. 
54 Article 13 TEU reads: 
 
1.   The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the 
common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications. 
2.   The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union 
in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. 
Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available 
by the Union and the Member States. 
3.   The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common 
foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European 
Council. 
The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall 
implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions. 
The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union. 
55 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related acts, October 2, 1997, OJ C 340/1 (1997). 
56 See Monar, J. “The European Union’s Foreign Affairs System after the Treaty of 
Amsterdam: A “Strengthened Capacity for External Action”?”, 2 European Foreign Affairs 
Review 1997, pp. 413-436. In this article, on page 434 the author concludes that, for the EU’s 
foreign affairs system, the Treaty of Amsterdam “brings only fragments of a reform”. 
57 Rosas, A. “The External Relations of the European Union: Problems and Challenges” in 
The Forum for US-EU Legal-Economic Affairs, The Mentor Group, 1998, p. 62. 
58 Not to mix with the Council of the EU. The European Council consists of the Heads of State 
and Government of the 25 Member States of the European Union. 
EU Legal Personality  Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 22
Another important change at Amsterdam is that the Secretary-General 
of the Council will assist the Presidency of the Council59 in matters dealing 
with the common foreign and security policy (Article 18.3 TEU).60 It is still 
unknown whether the High Representative for the common foreign and 
security policy will bring more coherence to the EU. One wonders how much 
coherence can be found in a system in which the Presidency will continue to 
assert its own role, the High Representative wishes to play an important role, 
and the Commission continues to be the representative of the EC in the first 
pillar,61 as well as fully associated with the second pillar and, therefore has its 
own voice.  
The Amsterdam Treaty also implies that parts of the third pillar62 have 
been transferred to the first pillar.63 This means that Community competence 
and supranational Community law are growing. The matters transferred from 
the third to the first pillar cover the entry of third-country nationals (visas, 
asylum, and immigration policy). This shows that, although the transfer of the 
 
59 The Presidency of the Council of the European Union has in broad terms three essential 
functions:  
1. Organizing and chairing meetings of the Council and its working groups; 
2. Representing the Council, both in its work with the other institutions and bodies of 
the EU, and internationally, for example in the United Nations and the World Trade 
Organization. The Presidency also represents the EU in its relations with countries 
outside the Union; and 
3. Ensuring that outstanding negotiations from the previous Presidency are taken 
forward, and if necessary are handed on to the following Presidency.  
The Presidency rotates among the EU Member States every six months. 
60 Article 18 (3) TEU reads: The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the 
Council who shall exercise the function of High Representative for the common foreign and 
security policy. 
61 This is the so-called Community pillar.  
62 The so-called "third pillar" refers to matters of police and judicial cooperation in the EU. 
63 The first pillar contains Title IV on “Visas, Asylum, Immigration and Other Policies 
Related to Free Movement of Persons.” 
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second pillar to the first may still seem remote, a gradual merger in one form 
or another of the two pillars seems inevitable for the construction of Europe. 
 The whole purpose of the creation of the CFSP was to enable the EU 
Member States to speak with one voice by creating a new entity which would 
do this on their behalf.64 The Amsterdam Treaty brought limited majority 
voting for implementing foreign policy once it has been agreed to in outline by 
unanimity (Title V of the consolidated version of the Treaty of Amsterdam),65 
and the definition and implementation of a foreign policy position have been 
helped further along by the existence of EC policy instruments, in particular, 
the budget. For example, the EC instruments advanced external policy with 
respect to the Mediterranean and to the New Transatlantic Agenda66 between 
the EU and the U.S., and enhanced cooperation with Asia through the ASEAN 
Initiative (Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration,67 of August 8, 
1967).68 In addition, the EU’s political relations with Central and Eastern 
Europe have been focused through Europe Agreements negotiated under the 
EC’s competence. 
 The EU’s achievements in assisting other nations have been 
significant. Under the CFSP in 1995, the EU gave Russia U.S.$ 1.5 billion to 
 
64 Wessel, R. “The Multi-Level Constitution of European Foreign Relations,” EUI Workshop 
Paper, April 2002, pp. 1-35, at 22. 
65 TEU Title V. 
66 The New Transatlantic Agenda, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 6, No. 49, 894-96 
(December 4, 1995). 
67 ASEAN is composed of 10 members. The six Founding Countries of ASEAN are Malaysia, 
Indonesia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei. The rest of countries are 
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. The aims and purposes of the Association are to 
accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development, and to promote 
regional peace and stability.  
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assist its transition to democracy. In 1996 European humanitarian aid totaled 
almost U.S.$ 2 billion. Because Member States have proved reluctant to 
contribute to CFSP action from national budgets, EC financing has become the 
norm, which means that de facto, there is an indirect communitarization of 
CFSP as the Commission presents the budget, and the European Parliament 
decides non-obligatory expenditures. In theory, CFSP has augmented the EU’s 
competence to act in external matters. In practice, without the political will 
necessary to adapt the decision-making machinery or to use it effectively, 
CFSP has done more to raise and to disappoint expectations, than it has to 
enhance the EU’s international role.69 
However, unity in foreign policy is a dramatic step forward and has 
made it easier for the EC to unify on commercial issues. As mentioned earlier, 
there are several areas where this cohesion is likely to spill over and impact 
the international arena. One example is that of competition policy, an area in 
which the Commission has been active since the early 1960s. With increasing 
worldwide economic interdependency and the emergence of global markets 
for a large number of products, more competition cases involve actions that 
take place outside of the EU,70 like the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas 
merger. In this respect, the EC-U.S. Cooperation Agreement (which provides 
the background for the McDonnell Douglas case) is worth mentioning. 
Competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic examined the issue, and 
 
68 Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 1233. 
69 The Treaty of Amsterdam: Text and Commentary (Andrew Duff ed., 1997). 
70 PIET EECKHOUT, THE EUROPEAN INTERNAL MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL 
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came to different conclusions. This case shows that even in carrying out 
policies that have traditionally been domestic, the EU is increasingly 
influencing economic matters in other parts of the world. 
In addition, nowhere is the effect of domestic policies likely to be as 
relevant as with the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).71 The EMU is 
essentially a domestic issue. However, EC authorities hope that the Euro will 
benefit international trade, having a major impact both on international 
markets, and on the weight attributed to the EU as an international actor. That 
said, the variable geometry of the EMU with its ins and outs poses a challenge 
for the unity of external representation in the economic sphere.72 To better 
understand the implications of the unitary character of the EU (or lack 
thereof), we must look at the legal interpretation of its role and responsibility. 
 
C.- The Case of External Economic Relations
The European Parliament, as well as other institutions, uses the term European 
Union when referring to the EC's external trade relations. However, lawyers 
should know that it is the European Community, and not the European Union, 
the one which has competence in the field of international trade relations. 
Clearly, the European Community is part of the European Union, but the latter 
 
TRADE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1994). 
71 PAUL BRETON ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A EUROPEAN TEXT (1997). 
72 NICHOLAS EMILIOU & DAVID O´KEEFFE, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD 
TRADE LAW: AFTER TH GATT URUGUAY ROUND (1996). 
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does not have international legal personality stricto sensu.73 The European 
Union is, therefore, not a member of international organizations.74 That is why 
it is said that the EU does not negotiate in the World Trade Organization’s 
agreements – it is the Commission instead- and is not a member of such an 
organization. It may be politically convenient to refer to the European Union 
rather than to the European Community as an international economic actor, 
but it is incorrect.75 
EC external relations are not limited to the field of trade policy. The 
Treaty is not very explicit about these other dimensions, but the European 
Court of Justice has attempted to clarify them. In the famous ERTA case on 
road transportation (Case 22/70, Commission v. Council),76 the Court ruled 
that a matter already regulated by the EU institutions could not be dealt with 
internationally without Community participation and approval, precisely 
because it has been regulated by an EU institution. External activity can take 
three main forms: 1) autonomous legislation, to set out rules for relations for 
the outside world; 2) negotiation, to arrive at agreements with third parties; 
and 3) dialogue, to gain a better understanding of other parties in order to 
 
73 This is a very debatable issue among scholars and practitioners. Some authors argue that the 
EU does have legal personality through Article 24 TEU. 
74 Paemen, H. “The European Union in International Affairs: Recent Developments,” 
Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 22, 1999, pp. 136-48. 
75 See Van den Bossche, P.L.H., “The European Community and the Uruguay Round 
Agreements” in Jackson, J. & Sykes, A. Implementing the Uruguay Round, Clarendon Press 
Oxford, 1997, footnote 1, p. 23. 
76 Commission v. Council, Case 22/70, 1971 E.C.R. 263. 
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better determine their own attitudes.77 It was the dialogue that gained 
importance in the late 1970s.  
In this context, we see that the EU now has diplomatic delegations in 
many capitals as well as in the U.N. headquarters (where it obtained official 
observer status in 1975). Since 1973, the EU has conducted a systematic 
dialogue with the U.S., Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, separate 
from the periodic discussions that take place regularly within the OECD. Since 
1977, the EU has also been involved in the economic world summits of the 
seven major industrialized nations, the so-called G 7.78 
Already in the late 1970s, the Community had become an important 
interlocutor, not only in trade but also in areas such as energy, fisheries and 
development policies. The Community was already a major actor in most 
world fora, often speaking with one voice, even if some aspects of the debate 
were not under its direct competence. Examples of this were the Conference 
on International Economic Cooperation (the so-called “North-South 
Dialogue”) in Paris in 1976-1977, when the Community had one single 
delegation to cover all points of the agenda, and the Euro-Arab dialogue. 
 During the period of the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), the U.S. continued to 
have much influence in world trade. Some of the early initiatives toward the 
Tokyo Round came from the American side such as the William Commission. 
 
77 Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, External Relations Powers of the European Community, 22 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 149 (1999). 
78 The main difference between the G8 and the G7 (both coexist) is that the G8 deals with 
political matters and includes Russia as a member, whereas the G7 is for economic matters, 
and Russia is excluded. 
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That said, the EC and the U.S. held informal discussions on various issues 
throughout the Tokyo Round to avoid major potential confrontation. When the 
U.S. and EC did not cooperate, there was a deadlock in the negotiations of the 
Tokyo Round since they had effective veto power. When the U.S. and the EC 
adopted a unified position, the combined efforts of others had minor chances 
of changing the outcome.79 
Looking back to the 1950s, what is most surprising is the place the EC 
now holds in world affairs. When the process of European integration started, 
the role of the EC in the international arena was minimal. As time has gone 
by, it has developed a greater role in international fora. There are a few 
important examples of EC action in the international arena in 1997. In the 
trade sector, the EC played an important role in two significant WTO 
agreements: the Telecommunications Service Agreement,80 which covers 
about 90% of world revenues in the telecommunications sector and the 
Agreement on Financial Services, which covers about 95% of trade in the 
banking, insurance, and security sectors. 
 In the same year, the EU donated Euros 438 million in humanitarian 
aid, and an EU special envoy was sent to support the Middle East Peace 
Process. The EU has adopted a strong position with regard to problematic 
states such as Cuba and Burma and led the industrialized nations in their 
 
79 Golt, S. The GATT Negotiations 1973-1979: The Closing Stage, (London, British-North 
American Committee), May 1978, p.1; Winham, “The Prenegotiation Phase of the Uruguay 
Round,” pp.289-290; Thomas, J.C. “The GATT and Multilateral Treaty Making: The Tokyo 
Round,” American Journal of International Law 77 (1983), pp. 70-71. 
80 Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (WTO 1997), 36 I.L.M. 
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decision to reduce greenhouse emissions by the year 2010 at the Kyoto 
Summit on Climate Change81 in the Conference of the Parties to the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, in December 
1997.82 Clearly, the EU has developed into a significant actor in many 
international spheres. 
 That said, it is important to note that more than just traditional external 
policies will define the EU’s role. As the EU has integrated to create a single 
European Market with a single currency, its domestic policies are increasingly 
influencing its role in the international arena.83 Since 1958, the vision of the 
EEC Founders has been expanding geographically as the EU has grown from 
six members to the current 25. With the Single European Act84 and the 
completion of the single market, economic integration has created a cohesive 
entity. Already in 1973, with the first enlargement of the EC to nine Member 
States, the EC had become the world’s largest trading bloc. 
 
354, 366 (1997). 
81 Leal-Arcas, R. “Is the Kyoto Protocol an Adequate Environmental Agreement to Solve the 
Climate Change Problem?,” in European Environmental Law Review, Vol. 10, Issue 10, 
winter 2001, pp. 282-294. 
82 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). 
83 David O’Keeffe, Community and Member State Competence in External Relations 
Agreements of the EU, 4 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 7 (1999). 
84 The Single European Act (SEA) was signed on February 17, 1986 in Luxembourg by 
representatives of the then twelve EC Member States. The Danish Parliament had rejected the 
project of institutional reform, but the Danish people approved it by referendum on February 
27, 1986. Apart from minor modifications, this Treaty was the first profound and wide-
ranging constitutional reform of the EU since the 1950s. The SEA introduced measures aimed 
at achieving an internal market (for instance, harmonization) plus institutional changes related 
to these (such as a generalization of qualified majority voting and a cooperation procedure 
involving the European Parliament). It also provided legal form for European Political 
Cooperation. 
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The 12-member EC of 1986 was already the largest trading power in 
the world. However, the EC, just like the U.S., showed some significant 
internal weaknesses to the outside world: although the European Commission 
has the power to initiate and execute decisions for its Member States in 
international trade negotiations, its proposals must, by law, first be approved 
by the EU Council. Some authors argue that this internal division is 
detrimental for the EC’s role as leader in the international trading system.85 
Toward the end of the Uruguay Round (early 90s), the U.S. leadership was 
being weakened. President Clinton utilized U.S. protectionist pressures which 
slowed the moves toward a Uruguay Round agreement. By contrast, Leon 
Brittan, EU trade commissioner at the time, adopted a more assertive role. 
This made the leadership between the U.S. and the EC in the framework of the 
Uruguay Round more balanced. 
 In the late 1990s, the EC devoted important efforts to encouraging other 
countries to launch a comprehensive WTO round. One of the reasons for the 
EC to favor a more comprehensive and broader agenda was that it believed 
there would be more opportunities for cross-cutting agreements among 
sectors. It would also facilitate progress in the negotiations themselves. 
However, the EC had neither the economic power nor the unity of purpose to 
replace the U.S. as a leader in the world trading system. Thus, a degree of 
consensus was necessary between the U.S. and the EC if a new WTO round 
 
85 Cohn, T.H. Governing Global Trade. International institutions in conflict and convergence,
Ashgate, 2002, at p. 282. 
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was to be possible. The U.S. and the EC have both become highly dependent 
on trade and they both had a shared interest in launching the new WTO round 
at Doha.86 
D.- A Debate on Competences in Foreign (Economic) Policy
Within the EU, there is exclusive and non-exclusive Community competence. 
In addition, Torrent speaks of other competences of the Member States which 
are exercised outside the institutional framework of the EU. However, in those 
cases where Member States exercise their competences outside the 
institutional framework of the EU, they must respect the obligations imposed 
by EC law (and by the Maastricht Treaty, as well). As we can deduce from 
this framework, the actors with a given legal personality and competences are 
the EC and its Member States. On the one hand, the Community always acts in 
the framework of the EU, since its institutional system has been taken by the 
TEU as an institutional system of the Union. On the other hand, its Member 
States may act outside the EU’s institutional system. 
Examples where Member States act outside the EU’s institutional 
system are inter alia when in January 2000 the German Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Mr Fischer (or any Minister from any EU Member State, for that 
matter) went to Moscow to see the Prime Minister of Russia, Mr Putin. In this 
 
86 Cohn, T.H. Governing Global Trade. International institutions in conflict and convergence,
Ashgate, 2002, at p. 284. 
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case, the German Minister visited Moscow on a bilateral basis and not 
representing the EU. Another example is the decision adopted by 14 EU 
Member States against Austria in February 2000 because of the creation of a 
new Government in Vienna with a national socialistic coalition. Measures at 
the highest political level were taken to show the other 14 Member States’ 
disagreement with the creation of such a Government in Vienna. Again, these 
measures were taken individually by each and every Member State of the then 
EU-15. Also, the humanitarian aid donated by Member States individually to 
the terrible events that occurred in Rwanda in 1997 is another example of 
Member States acting outside the EU’s institutional system. 
However, in certain cases Member States' competences can be 
exercised within the institutional system of the Union.87 Here one should 
understand that there are two functions of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community (TEC) which must be distinguished: 1) scope of 
application of the TEC and 2) scope of competence of the TEC. By this we 
mean, for example, that although criminal law is not outside the scope of 
application of the TEC, it is competence of the Member States. Another clear 
example is with education policies. At the moment, there is no common 
education policy in the EU. Therefore, it is an issue of national competence. 
However, it is no longer possible to discriminate against other nationals of any 
Member State of the Union when applying for a post as a teacher by virtue of 
 
87 See Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures dans l'Union 
Europeenne, in http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html, 1998, chapter 1. 
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not being nationals of the country where the application is taking place. In 
other words, it is no longer possible to restrict eligibility to a public teaching 
post on the basis of nationality within the EU.  
As a personal interpretation, it is obvious that there is a commitment 
among the Member States to put into practice all the necessary tools in order 
to achieve the goals of the EC Treaty. Perhaps this table might clarify in a 
visual way what has been said so far: 
 
Scope                                          Actors                                 Competence 





and EU Member States)90
Non-exclusive (shared) 
Competence92 
88 This new entity embraces both the Treaty of Rome and the two pillars of intergovernmental 
activity –Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice/Home Affairs-. 
89 As mentioned above, the EC is a supranational organization, i.e., one to which the Member 
States have transferred specific legislative and executive powers and whose decisions are 
binding on them and their citizens. For further details, see Drost, H. What’s what and Who’s 
who in Europe, Cassell, 1995, p. 207. 
90 By European institutions, we understand those institutions which deal with European issues 
and which are not national institutions. In the Community terminology, the first pillar deals 
with the European Communities (I should like to remind that throughout this dissertation, the 
term European Community shall be used to refer to the two remaining European 
Communities), whereas the second and third pillars have an intergovernmental character and, 
therefore, Member States deal with them. 
91 See, in this respect, Leal-Arcas, R. “Exclusive or Shared Competence in the Common 
Commercial Policy: From Amsterdam to Nice,” Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 30(1): 
3-14, 2003, as well as Leal-Arcas, R. “The European Community and Mixed Agreements,” 
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 6, Issue 4, Winter 2001, pp. 483-513, Kluwer Law 
International. 
92 Id.




Parliament and interest 
groups) 
CFSP,94 
police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal 
matters95 
4th Pillar96 
Outside the European 
Union’s institutional 
framework 
Member States act 
independently from the 
EU97 
Exclusive Member States’ 
competence98 
It is also important to say a few words about what Torrent calls the 
"fourth pillar" of the EU's institutional structure. If the reader studies the 
Maastricht Treaty,99 he or she will perceive that the CFSP has a very large 
scope, and that it covers the actions of EU Member States in the areas of 
external economic relations.100 In fact, 
1. Article 12 (ex-Article J.2) of the Maastricht Treaty refers to 
"any matter of foreign and security policy" and to "action in 
 
93 Member States, as actors in EC legislation, deal with CFSP and police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, which are forms of intergovernmental co-operation. They 
retain full sovereign rights, and hence, decision making is by unanimity. See, for further 
details, Drost, H. What’s what and Who’s who in Europe, Cassell, 1995, p. 207. 
94 CFSP stands for Common Foreign and Security Policy, which appears on Title V of the 
Treaty on European Union. 
95 It appears on Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. 
96 The idea of the “fourth pillar” is a creation of Ramòn Torrent. 
97 However, formally speaking, Member States have to follow the EC legal order. Even if 
Member States act bilaterally, they will be affected by the EC legal order. 
98 This covers areas in which the EC Treaty forbids the EC to legislate. 
99 The numbering of the Maastricht Treaty Articles is not the original one, but follows the 
changes made by the post-Maastricht Intergovernmental Conferences. 
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international organisations and at international conferences" 
without exception (therefore, without excluding economic 
conferences);101 
2. Article 13 of the Maastricht Treaty also has a general 
scope;102 and finally, 
3. Article 3 of the Maastricht Treaty establishes that "the Union 
shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external 
activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, 
security, economic and development policies."103 
100 Winter, J., Curtin, D., Kellermann, A. & de Witte, B. (eds.) Reforming the Treaty on 
European Union. The Legal Debate, Kluwer Law International, 1996. 
101 Article 12 (ex-Article J.2) of the Maastricht Treaty reads: 
 
1. Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of 
foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence 
is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.  
2. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common position.  
Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions.  
3. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at 
international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora.  
In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member 
States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions. 
102 Article 13 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union reads: 
 
1.   The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the 
common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications. 
2.   The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union 
in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. 
Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available 
by the Union and the Member States. 
3.   The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common 
foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European 
Council. 
The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall 
implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions. 
The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union. 
103 Article 3 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union reads: The Union 
shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the 
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However, no one has given such a broad interpretation of the CFSP. 
Why is this so? An authentic interpretation of the CFSP is one that addresses 
in the best of all possible ways, the interests of those civil servants who had 
to put the CFSP in action: 
1. from the point of view of the EU's national Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, the idea was to "keep" the CFSP for them, 
even if they did not like it so much; 
2. from the point of view of the Commission, there was only one 
strategy concerning the external economic relations, i.e., to 
extend the exclusive competence of the European Community 
as far as possible. This strategy was incompatible with an 
efficient co-ordination of the external economic policies of the 
Member States in the framework of the CFSP. 
It is this restrictive interpretation of the CFSP which necessarily 
provokes the development of what Torrent calls the "fourth pillar" of the 
EU.104 The term restrictive does not suggest a possible inclination of the 
 
continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and 
building upon the acquis communautaire.
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the 
context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council 
and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency and shall cooperate to 
this end. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its 
respective powers. 
104 One interesting point by Professor Torrent is the fact that making reference to the "fourth 
pillar" of the Union shows how the language of "three pillars" does not let us comprehend 
correctly the nature of the European Union. 
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CFSP toward the EC competences, but rather toward the side of the Member 
States acting outside the institutional framework of the EU. The so-called 
"fourth pillar" shows how within the institutional framework of the EU, the 
de facto common exercise of Member States' competences is mainly, but not 
exclusively, on issues of external economic relations. We may illustrate this 
with two very significant examples taken from multilateral and bilateral 
relations: 
1. when dealing with the management of the World Trade 
Organization Agreements, it is the Council of Ministers of the 
European Union which acts not only on behalf of the EC, but 
also on behalf of the Member States in the matters in which 
they are competent; 
2. the Association Agreements with the republics of the former 
Soviet Union deal mainly with the agreed treatment to the 
enterprises. This issue reveals Member States' competences. 
Proof of it lies in Opinion 2/92 of the European Court of 
Justice of 24 March 1995,105 which deals with the competence 
of the Community or of one of its institutions to participate in 
the third revised decision of the Council of the OECD106 
concerning national treatment. These agreements have been 
negotiated, and are integrally managed after their final 
 
105 ECR I-521. 
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conclusion, by the Council of the European Union and the 
European Commission. 
Torrent justifies the existence of a fourth pillar by saying that the 
exercise of Member States' external economic competences within the 
institutional framework of the EU does not show signs of being part of the 
"third pillar," "second pillar,"107 or "first pillar."108 Therefore, we must 
speak of a fourth pillar, if we wish to continue the linguistic usage of 
pillars.  
However, there are at least three comments to make regarding what 
has been said so far: 
- first comment: in order to fully understand the above table, a clear 
distinction between the scope of EC competences and the range of 
application of the EC Treaty must be made. Let us make use of two 
examples in order to explain this distinction.  
 
106 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is a forum of 30 
countries for discussion of economic policies between industrialised market economies, 
sharing a commitment to democratic government and the market economy. 
107 Even less so in the second pillar if we take into account the restrictive interpretation which 
has been given to the CFSP, which is the second pillar. 
108 It could not be part of this pillar since we are dealing precisely with the exercise of 
Member States' competences, and not with that of the Community's. 
EU Legal Personality  Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 39
Example one: Articles 149,109 150 (education, vocational training, 
and youth),110 151 (culture),111 and 152 EC (public health),112 limit the 
 
109 Article 149 EC reads: 
 
1.   The Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging 
cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their 
action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of 
teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity. 
2.   Community action shall be aimed at: 
- developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and 
dissemination of the languages of the Member States, 
- encouraging mobility of students and teachers, by encouraging inter alia, the academic 
recognition of diplomas and periods of study, 
- promoting cooperation between educational establishments, 
- developing exchanges of information and experience on issues common to the education 
systems of the Member States, 
- encouraging the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of socioeducational 
instructors, 
- encouraging the development of distance education. 
3.   The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and 
the competent international organisations in the field of education, in particular the Council of 
Europe. 
4.   In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, the 
Council: 
- acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive 
measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States, 
- acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt 
recommendations. 
110 Article 150 EC: 
 
1.   The Community shall implement a vocational training policy which shall support and 
supplement the action of the Member States, while fully respecting the responsibility of the 
Member States for the content and organisation of vocational training. 
2.   Community action shall aim to: 
- facilitate adaptation to industrial changes, in particular through vocational training and 
retraining, 
- improve initial and continuing vocational training in order to facilitate vocational integration 
and reintegration into the labour market, 
- facilitate access to vocational training and encourage mobility of instructors and trainees and 
particularly young people, 
- stimulate cooperation on training between educational or training establishments and firms, 
- develop exchanges of information and experience on issues common to the training systems 
of the Member States. 
3.   The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and 
the competent international organisations in the sphere of vocational training. 
4.   The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt 
measures to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this article, 
excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. 
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111 Article 151 EC reads: 
 
1.   The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, 
while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the 
common cultural heritage to the fore. 
2.   Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member 
States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas: 
- improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European 
peoples, 
- conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance, 
- non-commercial cultural exchanges, 
- artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector. 
3.   The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and 
the competent international organisations in the sphere of culture, in particular the Council of 
Europe. 
4.   The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions 
of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures. 
5.   In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, the 
Council: 
- acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the 
Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of 
the laws and regulations of the Member States. The Council shall act unanimously throughout 
the procedure referred to in Article 251, 
- acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt recommendations. 
112 Article 152 EC reads: 
 
1.   A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and 
implementation of all Community policies and activities. 
Community action, which shall complement national policies, shall be directed towards 
improving public health, preventing human illness and diseases, and obviating sources of 
danger to human health. Such action shall cover the fight against the major health scourges, by 
promoting research into their causes, their transmission and their prevention, as well as health 
information and education. 
The Community shall complement the Member States' action in reducing drugs-related health 
damage, including information and prevention. 
2.   The Community shall encourage cooperation between the Member States in the areas 
referred to in this Article and, if necessary, lend support to their action. 
Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission, coordinate among themselves their 
policies and programmes in the areas referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission may, in 
close contact with the Member States, take any useful initiative to promote such coordination. 
3.   The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and 
the competent international organisations in the sphere of public health. 
4.   The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall 
contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this article through adopting: 
(a) measures setting high standards of quality and safety of organs and substances of 
human origin, blood and blood derivatives; these measures shall not prevent any Member 
State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures; 
(b) by way of derogation from Article 37, measures in the veterinary and phytosanitary 
fields which have as their direct objective the protection of public health; 
(c) incentive measures designed to protect and improve human health, excluding any 
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. 
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Community's competence. Any kind of harmonization of legal provisions 
of the Member States is excluded from the scope of these Articles. 
However, this limitation does not mean that the national legislations in 
culture, education or health exceed the range of application of the treaties. 
They must respect the general principle of non-discrimination based on 
nationality, and its specific translation in the field of the four freedoms in 
EU law.113 
Example two: concerning the criminal legislation of Member States, 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has established that Member States 
must respect the general principles of EC law. If, for example, an infraction 
to customs regulations, before 1st January 1993 –date of completion of the 
internal market- was liable to a fine applicable to intra-Community trade, it 
should respect the principle of proportionality.114 The conclusions by the 
 
The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may also 
adopt recommendations for the purposes set out in this article. 
5.   Community action in the field of public health shall fully respect the responsibilities of the 
Member States for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care. In 
particular, measures referred to in paragraph 4(a) shall not affect national provisions on the 
donation or medical use of organs and blood. 
113 Let us remember for the non-specialised reader that the four freedoms are the free 
movement of goods, the free movement of persons, the free movement of capital and the 
freedom to provide services. This is certainly one of the great achievements of the EU, which 
has been able to create a frontier-free area within which people, goods, services and money 
can all move around freely. 
114 The principle of proportionality implies that any action by the EC should not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the EC Treaty. It should not be confused with 
the principles of subsidiarity, which enables the resolution of the considered action’s level 
(national of Community level), while the principle of proportionality concerns the size of the 
action. This principle has appeared in Court decisions since 1956, for example Coal 
Federation of Belgium –judgment of November 26, 1956. 
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Advocate-General Van Gerven in the case 212/88115 have a general 
appreciation of the Court's decisions over this issue. 
The distinction made from these two examples shows that 
Community treaties have two different functions. On the one hand, the 
typical function of an international treaty, i.e., to limit the exercise of the 
competences of the contracting parties (in other words, of the Member 
States when they are competent). On the other hand, the specific function 
of transferring a competence to the Community. This function of 
transferring competences to the Community is very specific, but not 
exclusive of Community treaties. The fact of not making this distinction 
has generated very generalized mistakes in the analysis of the distribution 
of external competences between the Community and its Member States. 
There was no distinction between the range of application of the treaties 
and the scope of EC competences. This mistake had terrible consequences 
when it was combined with the also mistaken thesis by which EC non-
exclusive competences become exclusive competences when there is a need 
to act at the international level. The combination of these two mistakes was 
the genesis of the thesis by which all the Agreements of the Uruguay 
Round were exclusive EC competence. 
- second comment: it should be underlined that there is a fine line 
between what EU Member States do outside and inside the institutional 
 
115 Ruling of the European Court of Justice of the European Communities of 26 October 
1989, ECR p. 3523. 
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system of the EU. The earlier example of former Yugoslavia is helpful 
here. Certain EU Member States decided to send troops outside the 
institutional system of the Union. But to what extent have the diplomatic 
initiatives from the various EU Member States been inside or outside the 
framework of the CFSP? And who pays for what in this same example? 
The same case would apply mutatis mutandis to the participation of the 
peace process in the Middle East. The best example of Member States' 
activities which are borderline with the Union's institutional system is the 
EU's participation in the UN. 
 - third comment: the table shown above is divided into three columns: 
1) the scope of the EU’s institutional framework; 2) the actors, and 3) their 
competences. It is not divided by issues. If we take the Schengen Agreement 
as an example, we can observe how this agreement used to be based outside 
the institutional framework of the EU. Nowadays, it is inside the institutional 
framework of the EU. The issues dealt with in the Schengen Agreement are, 
therefore, treated inside the institutional framework of the EU, as Member 
States’ competences. Some of these issues are also treated as Community 
competence.116 This is a very important point when it comes to external 
relations: very often a specific problem of international politics can be 
treated in various ways. The fact of being treated in one way or another has 
not only legal but also political consequences. The means taken and the 
foreseeable results are different. 
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Experience has proven that one of the bigger mistakes of the usage of 
pillars is that it prevents the same issue from being used in different ways. 
With the system of pillars in mind, people tend to ask to which pillar a 
specific issue belongs. Since a good number of national administrations (and 
certain services of the EU institutions) is organized by pillars instead of by 
issues, it is no surprise that this question causes internal conflicts of power 
and jealousy. This is why it is almost evident for national and Community 
civil servants that the political dialogue with third States belongs to the 
second pillar. However, joint declarations, which create this political 
dialogue, do not limit their scope to questions which, inside the Union, are 
treated within the framework of the CFSP.117 How can we then pretend to 
avoid third States form raising questions which relate to EC exclusive 
competence in the framework of this dialogue? 
 It should not be necessary to underline that the right approach is 
precisely the opposite of the one that comes from asking the question to what 
pillar a certain issue belongs. The issue must be analyzed from all possible 
angles in order to obtain the best solution. When various possible angles give 
different ways of action, then this approach implies a difficulty, namely that 
it has to guarantee coherence among the various ways of action. But 
politicians, senior civil servants, and jurists are paid by taxpayers to resolve 
 
116 Budge, I., Newton, K. et al. The Politics of the New Europe, Longman, 1997. 
117 Hill, C. (ed.) The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, Routledge, 1996. 
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these kinds of difficulties and not to find the way (intellectually easy but the 
wrong way) of putting each issue in only one of the potential ways of action. 
 
III. Legal Personality of the European Community 
 
From what is said above, it can be deduced that both Communities, given the 
supranational powers conferred on them and their institutions, satisfy the 
criteria for international legal personality, which appears in the Reparations 
case.118 The precedent of the Reparations case could have been limited in the 
sense that the opinion was related to an organization created by a number of 
States which comprised the vast majority of members of the international 
community at that time. Nowadays, there is almost no doubt that international 
organizations can have objective international personality, even when they 
have been brought into existence by only a limited number of States.119 In 
addition, as we see in Article 281 EC, Article 184 Euratom,120 and Article 6 
(1) of the already expired ECSC,121 each Community Treaty expressly confers 
legal personality on the organization it creates.122 Furthermore, each Treaty 
 
118 For an explanation on the Reparations Case, see McGoldrick, D. International Relations 
Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, pp. 26-8. 
119 McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, at p. 
28. 
120 Article 184 Euratom reads: The Community shall have legal personality. 
121 Article 6 (1) ECSC reads: The Community shall have legal personality. 
122 For a study on the ECSC, see Blumann C., Communauté européenne du charbon et de 
l’acier, in Rép. communautaire, Dalloz, Paris, 1992, 1; see also Caia G. and Aicardi N., 
Carbone e siderurgia, in Chiti M.P. e Greco G., Trattato di diritto amministrativo europeo, 
Giuffrè, Milano, II, 1997, 386 ; Mathijsen P., Le droit de la Communauté européenne du 
charbon et de l’acier. Une étude des sources, Nijhoff, La Haye, 1958, 62 ; Monaco R., 
Comunità economica europea del carbone e dell’acciaio (CECA), in Enc. giur., Istituto 
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confers powers on the Community to act in the international scene by 
concluding international agreements.123 Since there is a considerable exercise 
of these powers, even the exercise of developing the Communities’ 
participation in other international organizations, this is clear evidence of the 
recognition accorded by the international community to the legal capacity of 
the Communities under public international law.124 
The international legal personality of the EC125 has an objective 
existence in the international system even as regards states which do not 
recognize it.126 Let us remember that until 1988, the EC was not recognized127 
as an international organization by the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA, or commonly known as COMECON128).129 This position 
 
poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, Roma, 1988, 1-7; Panebianco M., Sub art.76 of the ECSC 
Treaty, in Quadri R., Monaco R. and Trabucchi A., Trattato istitutivo della Comunità europea 
del carbone e dell’acciaio cit., 1105; Pilotti M., C.E.C.A. (Comunità europea del carbone e 
dell’acciaio), in Novissimo digesto italiano, UTET, 1959, 75-87; Saulle M.R., Su la natura 
giuridica dei crediti spettanti alla CECA a titolo di prelievo generale, in RDI 1965, 634; 
Scovazzi T., Carbone e acciaio nel diritto comunitario, in Digesto delle discipline 
pubblicistiche, UTET, Torino, 1987, 493-502; Vignes D., La Communauté européenne du 
charbon et de l’acier: un exemple d’administration économique international, avec une 
préface de Paul Guggenheim, George Thone, Liege, 1956, 51; Zanghì C., Comunità europea 
del carbone e dell’acciaio, in Enc. Dir. Aggiornamento, V, Giuffrè, Milano, 2001, 238-240; 
Tesauro G., Sulla natura giuridica del prelievo C.E.C.A., in Rass.dir.pub. 1972, 221. 
123 See mainly Article 300 EC. 
124 Macloeod, I., Hendry. I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European Communities,
Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, p. 31. 
125 See Macleod, I., Hendry. I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European 
Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, chapter 2 and Frid, R. The Relations between the 
EC and International Organizations. Legal Theory and Practice, Kluwer Law Inernational, 
1995, pp. 21-6. 
126 McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, at p. 
28. 
127 As evidence of this, see inter alia the Council Decision 88/345, [1988] OJ L 154/34. 
128 COMECON was an economic organization from 1949 to 1991, linking the USSR with 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, East Germany (1950–1990), Mongolia 
(from 1962), Cuba (from 1972), and Vietnam (from 1978), with Yugoslavia as an associated 
member. Albania also belonged between 1949 and 1961. Its establishment was prompted by 
the Marshall Plan. Comecon was formally disbanded in June 1991. It was agreed in 1987 that 
official relations should be established with the European Community, and a free-market 
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adopted by COMECON was rectified shortly before COMECON was 
dissolved. In any event, it is pertinent to examine the provisions of the EC 
Treaty that are relevant to the EC’s international relations. In this respect, we 
refer to Part VI of the Treaty of Rome, Articles 281-312. As explained earlier, 
positive law is clear and precise. Article 281 EC reads: 
 
The Community shall have legal personality. 
 
This proves the personality of the EC in international law, and not just 
in each of the Member States. Article 282 EC corroborates this statement even 
more clearly, by saying that the Community shall also “enjoy the most 
extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons” in each of the Member 
States.130 In such a case, the EC is represented by the Commission. Examples 
of it are Case T-451/93, San Marco Impex Italiana SA v Commission,131 and 
Case C-257/90, Italsolar SpA v Commission.132 
Let us now tackle the more controversial question of the EU's legal 
personality. 
 
approach to trading was adopted in 1990. In January 1991 it was agreed that Comecon should 
be effectively disbanded. See 
http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/hutchinson/m0006083.html (last visited June 
30, 2005). 
129 See Morawiecki, W. “Actors and Interests in the Process of Negotiations between the 
CMEA and the EEC,” 1989/2, Legal Issues of European Integration, pp. 1-38. 
130 Article 282 EC reads: 
 
In each of the Member States, the Community shall enjoy the most extensive legal capacity 
accorded to legal persons under their laws; it may, in particular, acquire or dispose of movable 
and immovable property and may be a party to legal proceedings. To this end, the Community 
shall be represented by the Commission. 
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IV. Legal Personality of the European Union?133 
Lawyers have long discussed whether the EU can have external relations at 
all. This is because the Treaties confer legal personality to the two remaining 
Communities and not to the Union as such. When treaties are concluded in the 
framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU 
technically lacks legal personality.134 However, as we will analyze later, the 
situation with respect to the EU legal personality has fundamentally changed 
since the enforcement of the Treaty of Amsterdam,135 although Article 24 
TEU136 refers to the conclusion of CFSP agreements by the Council.137 
131 [1994] ECR II-1061. 
132 [1990] ECR I-3841. 
133 Tizzano A., «La personalità internazionale dell’Unione europea», in Dir. Un. Europea 
1998, 394. 
134 Eaton, M.R. Common Foreign and Security Policy, in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P. (eds.) 
LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, Chichester, Wiley Chancery, 1994, p. 
224. 
135 Rosas, A. The European Union and mixed agreements, in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. 
(eds.) THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 203. 
136 Article 24 TEU reads: 
 
1.   When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or international 
organisations in implementation of this title, the Council may authorise the Presidency, 
assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect. Such 
agreements shall be concluded by the Council on a recommendation from the Presidency. 
2.   The Council shall act unanimously when the agreement covers an issue for which 
unanimity is required for the adoption of internal decisions. 
3.   When the agreement is envisaged in order to implement a joint action or common position, 
the Council shall act by a qualified majority in accordance with Article 23(2). 
4.   The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters falling under Title VI. When the 
agreement covers an issue for which a qualified majority is required for the adoption of 
internal decisions or measures, the Council shall act by a qualified majority in accordance 
with Article 34(3). 
5.   No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council 
states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other 
members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall nevertheless apply provisionally. 
6.   Agreements concluded under the conditions set out by this Article shall be binding on the 
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The Maastricht Treaty created a new entity, the European Union, and 
“fundamentally changed the organizational framework and structure around 
the EC. It introduced two intergovernmental pillars, one on [...] CFSP and one 
on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).”138 Although the Maastricht Treaty did 
not want to give the EU a legal personality in an explicit way, none of its 
provisions prevents the EU from developing such a personality in a 
progressive way. In fact, to a non-expert in international affairs, it might 
appear that the EU has a legal personality. If that is not the case, how could 
this non-expert interpret the various positions, as well as political and legal 
engagements, under the Union’s name? If, despite all these legal and political 
engagements, the Union does not have (yet) a legal personality,139 then the 
reason for it must be found inside the European Union. It is the composing 
entities of the European Union (not only the Member States, but also the 
Community and, in particular, two of its institutions -the Commission and the 
Council) which have refused in the past to accept this personality. When 
looking at the functional approach of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
one can deduce that the EU could have international legal personality. 
 
institutions of the Union. 
137 Paasivirta, The European Union: From an Aggregate of States to a Legal Person?, 2 
Hofstra Law & Policy Symposium, 1997, pp. 37-59. 
138 McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, at p. 
4. 
139 This issue would be solved by the EU Constitutional Treaty, which explicitly gives legal 
personality to the EU. 
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Nevertheless, it has been asserted that the EU does not have international legal 
personality.140 
Let us start with an analysis of the arguments against the existence of 
an EU legal personality. 
 
A.- Arguments against the Existence of an EU Legal Personality141 
In evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities, Eaton stated that “…we do not believe that the Union will 
constitute an international organisation with a separate international legal 
personality. It would be better characterised as an association of Member 
States which, for certain purposes described in the Treaty, act in common.”142 
Eaton set out the reasoning behind this in the following way: 
 
1. “There is no provision in the Treaty on European Union similar 
to Article 210 (new Article 281) of the Treaty of Rome, which 
expressly says that the Community shall have legal 
personality”. 143 
140 See McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, 
at p. 37. 
141 The arguments here are almost entirely based on the pre-Amsterdam Treaty. The comments 
are of historical interest and might have been affected by later developments of the post-
Amsterdam Treaty. 
142 See declaration by Eaton, M.R. in House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities, Human Rights Reexamined, Session 1992-93, 3rd Report, HL Paper 10, pr. 129. 
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However, as McGoldrick rightly points out, “international personality 
could be inherent or potential in the EU on a functional basis, applying the 
approach of the ICJ in the Reparations Case.”144 
2. “Various functions that you would expect the Union to 
exercise, if it did have such personality, are in fact exercised by 
the Community, e.g. all the provisions on concluding external 
Treaties are in the Community Treaty and provide for the 
Community to conclude such Treaties. There are no such 
powers given to the Union, in CFSP or else where. Similarly, 
citizenship is in the Community section.” 145 
Here Eaton was right. The Community (and not the Union) concludes 
international agreements, either alone or together with some or all of the 
Member States.146 According to McGoldrick, the Union would be capable of 
possessing international personality if it were recognized by other 
international actors when trying to conclude, or be party to, international 
agreements under any of the three EU pillars.147 
143 Eaton, M.R. “Common Foreign and Security Policy” in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P. (eds.) 
Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, Chichester, Wiley Chancery, 1994, p. 224. 
144 See McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, 
at p. 37.  
145 Eaton, M.R. “Common Foreign and Security Policy” in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P. (eds.) 
Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, Chichester, Wiley Chancery, 1994, p. 224. 
146 If it is in the latter case, then we are dealing with mixed agreements, which are agreements 
where both the EC and its Member States are contracting parties, on the European side, to an 
international agreement with a third party. 
147 See McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, 
at p. 37. 
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3. “The evidence of the (unpublished) travaux preparatoires:
there was a clear intention during negotiations not to confer 
legal personality. The question was raised, and the Dutch 
Presidency said firmly that the Union would not have legal 
personality. They were supported by the Director General of 
the Council Legal Service. The Director General of the 
Commission Legal Service has taken the same view in 
evidence to the European Parliament.” 148 
This view mentioned by Eaton concerning the position of the EU 
Council legal service in relation to the EU legal personality has radically 
changed. In fact, in February 2000, at the EU Council, there were interesting 
legal debates as to whether the EU has, and is capable of having, legal 
personality. Already in 1992, the UK took the view that the Union will not 
have international legal personality. However, at the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC), the European Parliament (EP) called for the Union to be 
given international personality.149 This, in principle, proves and demonstrates 
that the EP accepts the fact that the EU does not have international legal 
personality for the time being. The Commission also appeared to accept this 
view.150 The question of the EU’s international legal personality was also 
 
148 Eaton, M.R. “Common Foreign and Security Policy” in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P. (eds.) 
Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, Chichester, Wiley Chancery, 1994, p. 224. 
149 European Parliament’s Report to the 1996 IGC, pr. 14 (ii). 
150 See Commission’s Report to the 1996 IGC, p. 64. 
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addressed in the Reflection Group for the 1996 IGC. Its final report stated as 
follows: 
 
“A majority of members points to the advantage of 
international legal personality for the Union so that it can 
conclude international agreements on the subject-matter of 
Titles V and VI concerning the CFSP and the external 
dimension of justice and home affairs. For them, the fact that 
the Union does not legally exist is a source of confusion 
outside and diminishes its external role. Others consider that 
the creation of international legal personality for the Union 
could risk confusion with the legal prerogatives of member 
states.”151 
Along these lines, McGoldrick argues:  
 
“if the EU did have international personality then it 
would be very wide ranging, though still not plenary. Indeed, 
it would come very close to having all of the international 
personality of a state. That is, no doubt, an important factor 
 
151 Report of the Reflection Group on the Intergovernmental Conference, December 1995, 2, 
p. 40. 
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for those states that oppose international personality for the 
EU.”152 
Nonetheless, as can be gathered from the Progress Report on IGC, 
Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Florence, 21-22 June 
1996, it should be possible to have provisions drafted that would enable the 
EU, instead of the EC, to be party to international agreements without 
modifying the principles of competence in the EU pillar.153 For the EU, being 
a party to international agreements concerning the two intergovernmental 
pillars could also be useful as long as a clear provision was made to deal with 
questions of competence, and the relationship with the powers of the Member 
States.154 
This state of affairs provokes contradictions, even situations that are 
difficult to explain. This is mainly the case where the consequence of this 
refusal to having a legally engaged European Union brings to accepting the 
Commission to sign memoranda of understanding on behalf of the Union (for 
example, with the UN and its dependent organisms), although the Commission 
does not have this competence under the framework of the TEU or the TEC. 
For the time being, the European Union does not explicitly possess 
legal personality. In other words, there is no Article in the treaties –unlike the 
 
152 See McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, 
at p. 38. 
153 See Progress Report on IGC, Presidency Conclusions, European Council in Florence, 21-
22 June 1996, Doc. SN300/96, Annexes, p. 36 at 2 (a). 
154 Ibid., at 2 (b). 
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case of the EC- which gives explicit legal personality to the EU. In this 
respect, I would like to raise a hypothesis: what would happen if one day one 
of the lorries with humanitarian aid from the European Union, in the 
framework of a joint action within the structure of the CFSP, had an accident 
in a village of former Yugoslavia or in the region of the Great Lakes,155 for 
example? Who would be civilly responsible for this action? If an international 
judiciary body had to examine such a case, how can we prevent this 
organization from attributing responsibility to the EU for the accident and 
damages? From here we can deduce that, if we want to be precise and 
responsible, we should stop saying “the Union does...” and instead say, who 
really does what: the Community, the EU Member States, or both together? 
As mentioned earlier, during the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations, the 
issue of the European Union’s legal personality was raised, thanks in 
particular to the efforts of the legal advisor at the Amsterdam 
Intergovernmental Conference. The idea of giving legal personality explicitly 
to the Union in its own right was fought against not only by certain Member 
States, but also, and mainly, by the Commission, possibly implying at the 
same time a merger of the then three (currently two) existing legal persons –
the European Communities. The Commission foresaw, in recognizing the 
legal personality of the Union, a kind of competition with the legal personality 
 
155 The region of the Great Lakes of Africa refers to the region around the following lakes: 
Lake Tanganyika, Lake Victoria - the world's third largest lake-, Lake Albert, Lake Edward, 
Lake Kivu, and Lake Malawi. These include the entirety of the nations of Rwarnda, Burundi, 
and Uganda as well as portions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, and 
Kenya. 
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of the European Community and with the Commission’s role in the exercise of 
the legal personality of the European Community. When we saw the 
possibility of a merger of the EU’s legal personality with that of the EC’s legal 
personality, this possibility appeared to the eyes of the Commission as a risk to 
the Community’s identity. It is interesting to note, though, that this does not 
prevent the delegations of the European Commission in third States from 
presenting themselves as delegations of the “European Union.” 
In the final text of the Amsterdam Treaty, any kind of explicit 
recognition of the EU’s legal personality is avoided. However, a specific 
Article recognizes the possibility that the Council of the European Union sign 
international agreements under the framework of the CFSP and of JHA. The 
Article (Art. 24 TEU)156 reads: 
 
1.   When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or 
more States or international organisations in implementation of 
this title, the Council may authorise the Presidency, assisted by 
the Commission as appropriate, to open negotiations to that 
effect. Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council on a 
recommendation from the Presidency. 
2.   The Council shall act unanimously when the agreement 
covers an issue for which unanimity is required for the 
adoption of internal decisions. 
3.   When the agreement is envisaged in order to implement a 
joint action or common position, the Council shall act by a 
qualified majority in accordance with Article 23(2). 
4.   The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters 
falling under Title VI. When the agreement covers an issue for 
which a qualified majority is required for the adoption of 
 
156 Article amended by the Treaty of Nice. 
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internal decisions or measures, the Council shall act by a 
qualified majority in accordance with Article 34(3). 
5.   No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose 
representative in the Council states that it has to comply with 
the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other 
members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall 
nevertheless apply provisionally. 
6.   Agreements concluded under the conditions set out by this 
Article shall be binding on the institutions of the Union. 
 
This Article creates interpretation problems which are not easy to 
solve, especially if examined from the perspective of third States or 
international organizations which are parties to these agreements. With whom 
will they be internationally engaged: with the Union as such? With the entire 
group of Member States of the Union? Two more points about putting into 
practice such an Article: 
1.- this Article shall not be applied if there is no need to make use of 
the possibility described in the last phrase of the fifth paragraph of 
Article 24 TEU; 
2.- from a political point of view, these agreements will be referred to 
as “European Union agreements” in the international arena. In any 
event, all agreements concluded by the European Community are 
classified by the media and the public opinion as “European Union 
agreements,” and not as “pure Community agreements.”157 
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Let us now present a legal analysis of Article 24 TEU and its 
interpretation to see whether the EU might possess legal personality. 
 
B.- Arguments for the Existence of an EU Legal Personality
B.1.- Analysis of Article 24 TEU: Its Interpretation and Application 
 
Despite all the above said, there is an interpretation of Article 24 TEU which 
gives the capacity of external action to the EU. For that, we shall try to 
analyze the negotiation and conclusion of EU international agreements with 
one or more third States in the framework of Titles V158 and VI159 of the TEU, 
and the legal consequences which might derive from there.  
To start with, Article 24 TEU is a provision which is part of an agreement 
in public international law. Secondly, Article 24 TEU provides a certain 
procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements on 
CFSP with various States or international organizations. Thirdly and most 
importantly, the main question is to know on behalf of whom agreements 
under this provision are concluded. Even if it is not said explicitly in Article 
24 TEU, those agreements concluded by the Council are agreements which are 
 
157 In areas of non-exclusive EC competence, the EC can, if the EU Council of Ministers so 
decides, enter into agreements with third countries without formal adherence of EU Member 
States to these agreements, thereby having a so-called pure Community agreement. 
158 TITLE V refers to provisions on a common foreign and security policy. 
159 TITLE VI relates to provisions on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
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concluded on behalf of the EU, and not on behalf of Member States. Here are 
a few points to explain this view: 
 
• Let us interpret Article 24 TEU in the context of other provisions of the 
TEU, and in particular of its Title V. We conclude that the EU can be 
considered as an entity that is different and autonomous from its Member 
States and which has, in the field of external relations, its own means of 
action. Among these means of action are, inter alia, joint actions and 
common positions adopted by the EU Council under the terms of Articles 
14160 and 15 TEU.161 There is no doubt that both joint actions and common 
 
160 Article 14 TEU (consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal C 
325, 24 December 2002) reads: 
 
1.   The Council shall adopt joint actions. Joint actions shall address specific situations where 
operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down their 
objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, 
and the conditions for their implementation. 
2.   If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to 
joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take the 
necessary decisions. As long as the Council has not acted, the joint action shall stand. 
3.   Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the 
conduct of their activity. 
4.   The Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals 
relating to the common foreign and security policy to ensure the implementation of a joint 
action. 
5.   Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to 
a joint action, information shall be provided in time to allow, if necessary, for prior 
consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply 
to measures which are merely a national transposition of Council decisions. 
6.   In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a Council 
decision, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having 
regard to the general objectives of the joint action. The Member State concerned shall inform 
the Council immediately of any such measures. 
7.   Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a Member State shall 
refer them to the Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such 
solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness. 
161 Article 15 TEU claims that: “The Council shall adopt common positions. Common 
positions shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or 
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positions adopted by the EU Council are acts of the EU, and not of the 
Member States. It is also clear that when the Council adopts a joint action 
or a common position, it acts as an institution of the EU. It is in this 
context that Article 24 TEU should be considered as a means of action of 
the EU in the international scenario. In other words, Article 24 TEU offers 
the EU the option to participate in an international agreement. 
• When it is on the basis of Article 24 TEU, then the Council acts as a 
common entity of all Member States, whereas on the basis of Articles 14 
and 15 TEU, the EU Council acts as a European institution. In this regard, 
it is important to note that, according to Article 3.1 TEU,162 the Union has 
a single institutional framework and that, according to Article 3.2 TEU,163 
the Council has the co-responsibility (with the Commission) to ensure the 
consistency of the EU’s external activities. The Council should be 
considered as the institution acting on behalf of the EU every time the 
provisions of the TEU give a power of action to the Council and provide a 
procedure. This can also be valid to Article 24 TEU. Had the intention of 
 
thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the 
common positions.” 
162 Article 3.1 TEU reads: 
 
The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the 
consistency and continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while 
respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire.
163 Article 3.2 TEU disposes: 
 
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the 
context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council 
and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency and shall cooperate to 
this end. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its 
respective powers. 
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the TEU lawmaker been to create the Council as an agency of EU Member 
States, then the appropriate formula would have been to provide that the 
decision to conclude such agreements would be adopted by the 
representatives of Member States in the Council. 
• According to Article 24.1 TEU, the Presidency (assisted by the 
Commission, if need be) is authorized by the Council to conduct 
negotiations with another party. In the light of Article 18.1 TEU,164 the 
Presidency shall represent the Union, and not the Member States. This 
corroborates that Article 24 TEU provides a procedure of negotiating and 
concluding agreements on behalf of the EU. 
• Finally, Article 24 TEU is part of Title V of the TEU. That said, according 
to Article 11.1 TEU,165 it is the EU which defines and implements the 
CFSP. As a result, an agreement concluded in application of Title V must 
necessarily be an EU agreement in the framework of the CFSP. 
 
164 Article 18.1 TEU says that the Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming 
within the common foreign and security policy. 
165 Article 11.1 TEU reads: 
 
The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all 
areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be: 
- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the 
Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; 
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; 
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles 
of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the 
objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external boarders; 
- to promote external cooperation; 
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. 
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Article 24.5 TEU mentions that “No agreement shall be binding on a 
Member State whose representative in the Council states that it has to comply 
with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other members 
of the Council may agree that the agreement shall nevertheless apply 
provisionally.” We can deduce that, in the absence of such a declaration by a 
Member State, agreements concluded in the framework of Article 24 TEU are 
binding on EU Member States. Such a provision would not make any sense if 
in any case these agreements were to bind Member States and only the 
Member States. This provision verifies the fact that agreements concluded in 
the framework of Article 24 TEU are binding on the EU as well as on Member 
States, except in cases mentioned in Article 24.5 TEU. In addition, Article 300 
(7) EC166 says that agreements concluded by the EC are binding on Member 
States. Therefore, Member States must act in conformity with such 
agreements. Article 24 TEU should be interpreted in those same terms. 
With regard to Declaration Number 4, adopted by the Amsterdam 
Conference and annexed to the final act of the Amsterdam Treaty, concerning 
Articles 24 (ex-Article J.14) and 38 (ex-Article K.10)167 of the Treaty on the 
European Union, its content does not go against the above interpretation of 
Article 24 TEU.168 Firstly, the content of this declaration implicitly recognizes 
 
166Article 300 (7) EC reads that “Agreements concluded under the conditions set out in this 
Article shall be binding on the institutions of the Community and on Member States.” 
167 Article 38 TEU reads: Agreements referred to in Article 24 may cover matters falling 
under this title [provisions on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters]. 
168 Declaration Number 4 on Articles J.14 and K.10 of the Treaty on European Union reads: 
“The provisions of Articles J.14 and K.10 of the Treaty on European Union and any 
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the existence of the EU as a separate entity from the Member States, 
considering it provides a theoretical possibility of a transfer of competences 
from the Member States to the EU. Secondly, although this declaration does 
not mention the existence of an EU competence as derived from the existing 
provisions of the TEU, the EU does have the necessary powers and 
“competence” to define and implement a common foreign and security policy. 
From this optic, Article 24 TEU does not increase this EU competence, since 
it provides the conclusion of agreements “in implementation of this title [V on 
provisions of a common foreign and security policy],”169 which means that the 
competence has been attributed to the EU in other Articles of Title V of the 
TEU. Therefore, agreements concluded under the terms of Article 24 TEU 
must necessarily respect the framework of EU powers that derive from Title V 
of the TEU. 
From what is said above about Declaration Number 4, we cannot 
deduce that agreements under Article 24 TEU are concluded on behalf of the 
Member States. Article 24 TEU only establishes a process for the negotiation 
and conclusion of agreements, but is neutral concerning the issue of 
competences for Member States and for the EU.  
Lastly, from a more practical viewpoint, it is unthinkable that the EU 
cannot participate in the international scenario via international agreements. 
For example, in the progressive framing of a common defence policy 
 
agreements resulting from them shall not imply any transfer of competence from the Member 
States to the European Union.” 
169 Article 24.1 TEU. 
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concerning relations with the Parliamentary Assembly of Western European 
Union (WEU)170 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),171 the 
EU should have the possibility to conclude the necessary agreements with 
such institutions. In fact, as Article 17 TEU172 indicates, the common defence 
 
170 The Western European Union (WEU) is a partially dormant European defence and security 
organization, established on the basis of the Treaty of Brussels of 1948 with the accession of 
West Germany and Italy in 1954. The WEU is led by a Council of Ministers, assisted by a 
Permanent Representatives Council on ambassadorial level. A Parliamentary Assembly - 
rather unique for an intergovernmental organization- would oversee the work of the Council. 
Most of the WEU functions are in the process of being merged into the EU. The Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council (composed of the delegations of the member states to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe), is fearful for its future existence, and has 
been lobbying for itself to be recognized as the "European Security and Defence Assembly." 
This would allow it to function within the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 
structures within the EU. 
171 The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), also called the North Atlantic Alliance, 
the Atlantic Alliance or the Western Alliance, is an international organization for collective 
security established in 1949, in support of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington, 
D.C., on 4 April 1949. 
 The Treaty cautiously avoids reference both to the identification of an enemy and to 
any concrete measures of common defense. Nevertheless, it was intended so that if the USSR 
and its allies launched an attack against any of the NATO members, it would be treated as if it 
was an attack on all member states. This marked a significant change for the United States, 
which traditionally harboured strong isolationist groups across parties in Congress. However, 
the feared invasion of Western Europe never came. Instead, the provision was invoked for the 
first time in the treaty's history on 12 September 2001, in response to the September 11 attacks 
on the U.S. the day before. 
172 Article 17 of the consolidated version of the TEU, amended by the Treaty of Nice, reads: 
 
1.   The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security 
of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might 
lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case 
recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements. 
The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the 
obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible 
with the common security and defence policy established within that framework. 
The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States 
consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments. 
2.   Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. 
3.   Decisions having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall be taken without 
prejudice to the policies and obligations referred to in paragraph 1, second subparagraph. 
4.   The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation 
between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the Western 
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policy also constitutes a policy of the EU.  Therefore, it would seem 
inconsistent not to admit the capacity to conclude international agreements in 
order to implement this policy. Most recently, an agreement between the 
International Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation and 
assistance, signed on April 10, 2006 and entered into force on May 1, 2006, 
proves that certain members of the international community do recognize the 
EU legal personality.173 
B.2.- Interpretations on the EU's Capacity of External Action 
 
There are interpretations on the EU’s capacity of external action.174 This 
capacity is not supported by the preparatory work of the Maastricht Treaty or 
subsequent practice. As an example, there is a Memorandum of Understanding 
of 1994 between the EU and the Western European Union, on the one hand, 
and various ex-Yugoslavia actors, on the other, which set up an EU 
administration for the City of Mostar. This Memorandum was prepared within 
the context of the second pillar and had to be concluded on behalf of the 
“Member States of the European Union acting within the framework of the 
 
European Union (WEU) and NATO, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or 
impede that provided for in this title. 
5.   With a view to furthering the objectives of this Article, the provisions of this Article will 
be reviewed in accordance with Article 48. 
173 OJ (L 115, pp. 50-57), 28 April 2006. 
174 See, in this respect, Klabbers, J. “Presumptive Personality: The European Union in 
International Law”, in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects of the European 
Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 231-53. 
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Union in full association with the European Commission.”175 Here one could 
ask whether the cumbersome title of the Mostar Memorandum of 
Understanding is conductive to asserting the “identity” of the EU in the 
international scene, which, according to Article 2 TEU,176 is one of the 
objectives of the Union. 
 In the post-Maastricht era, the concept of the Union stands out as a 
signpost. The general public, as well as third States and international 
organizations, may well be under the impression that the EC no longer exists. 
It is normally the EU that enters into an engagement when policy documents, 
which are not going through the formalities of a treaty, are drawn up. As an 
example, we have the comprehensive political arrangement relating to the EU-
 
175 See Bury, C & Hetsch, P. “Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune” Rép. 
Communautaire Dalloz, October 1996, pp. 1-11, at p. 8. 
176 Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992), reads: 
 
The Union shall set itself the following objectives: 
- to promote economic and social progress and a high level of employment and to achieve 
balanced and sustainable development, in particular through the creation of an area without 
internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the 
establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency in 
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, 
- to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a 
common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence 
policy, which might lead to a common defence, in accordance with the provisions of Article 
17, 
- to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States 
through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union, 
- to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the 
free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to 
external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime, 
- to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it with a view to considering to 
what extent the policies and forms of cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need to be 
revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of 
the Community. 
 
The objectives of the Union shall be achieved as provided in this Treaty and in accordance 
with the conditions and the timetable set out therein while respecting the principle of 
subsidiarity as defined in Article 5 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
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U.S. dispute over U.S. unilateral sanctions policy, i.e., Helms-Burton Act. 
This arrangement was concluded at the EU-U.S. Summit in London on May 
18, 1998, and refers continuously to the EU as one of the parties.  
The package adopted at this Summit includes an “Understanding with 
Respect to Disciplines for the Strengthening of Investment Protection,”177 the 
“Transatlantic Partnership on Political Co-operation” and an “Understanding 
on Conflicting Requirements.” The negotiations leading up to this package 
were based on an EU-U.S. Understanding of 11 April 1997.178 This 
Understanding enabled the EU to suspend a case against the U.S. in the 
context of the World Trade Organization.179 Also, a Joint Declaration on EU-
Palestinian Security Co-operation, agreed with the Palestinian Authority on 
April 20, 1998, refers to the EU as the other party. In these two examples, 
there are concrete commitments of a political, rather than a legally binding 
nature (soft law). 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
Although, technically speaking, the EU does not have legal personality in an 
explicit manner, the following conclusions can be made: 
 
177 http://www.eurunion.org/partner/summit/Summit9805/invest.htm (last visited June 2, 
2006). 
178 See the Understanding between the European Union and the United States on U.S. 
extraterritorial legislation - 11 April 1997, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/us/extraterritoriality/understanding_04_97.htm
(last visited June 2, 2006). 
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• Any interpretation of Article 24 TEU in the sense that agreements 
concluded in the framework of this provision are binding on Member 
States, but not on the EU, would be in contradiction with the other 
provisions of the TEU, and more precisely with its Title V. 
• The fact that, at the Intergovernmental Conference of Amsterdam, certain 
Member States were opposed to giving a legal personality to the EU, does 
not mean that the Conference did not intend to provide the EU with the 
means to conclude international agreements. Hence, one could argue that 
there is an implicit EU legal personality through Article 24 TEU.  
• Article 24 TEU should be interpreted in the sense that agreements 
concluded by the Council within this provision are concluded by the 
Council on behalf of the EU, and they are binding on the EU. This does 
not mean that Member States cannot take action themselves to implement 
the CFSP. Certainly they can. Nor does it mean that the Council does not 
also act on behalf of the Member States. As an example, we have the 
imposition of immigration restrictions envisaged by a Council common 
position, covered by Title VI of the TEU (provisions on police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters), where individual Member States are free 
to take action independently of the rest of EU Member States, or the 
Council. 
 
179 For the background to the dispute, see Sterm, B. “Vers la mondialisation juridique? Les 
lois Helms-Burton et D’Amato-Kennedy,” Revue Générale de Droit International Public,
1996, pp. 979-1003. 
